Sibling influence on the human capital of the left-behind by Biavaschi, Costanza et al.
Sibling influence on the human capital of 
the left­behind 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Biavaschi, C., Giulietti, C. and Zimmermann, K. F. (2015) 
Sibling influence on the human capital of the left­behind. 
Journal of Human Capital, 9 (4). pp. 403­438. ISSN 1932­8664 
doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/683543 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/52532/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
Published version at: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/683543 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/683543 
Publisher: University of Chicago Press 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Sibling Influence on the
Human Capital of the Left-Behind ∗
Costanza Biavaschi† Corrado Giulietti‡ Klaus F. Zimmermann§
(forthcoming in the Journal of Human Capital, 2015)
Abstract
While a growing literature has analyzed the effects of parental migration on the
educational outcomes of children left behind, this study is the first to highlight the
importance of sibling interactions in such a context. Using panel data from the RUMiC
Survey, we find that sibling influence on school performance is stronger among left-
behind children. Hence, parental migration seems to trigger changes in familial roles
and sibling effects among children. However, it is primarily older sisters who exhibit a
positive influence on their younger siblings. We corroborate our results by performing a
series of tests to mitigate endogeneity issues. The results from the analysis suggest that
sibling effects in migrant households might be a mechanism shaping children’s outcomes
and success and that adjustments within the family left behind have the potential to
generate benefits – or reduce hardships – in response to parental migration.
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1 Introduction
After decades of research on the factors that induce people to migrate and the consequences
for the receiving regions, the literature has now turned its attention to the effects of migration
on the sending areas. Within this context, recent studies have focused on the impact of family
separation on individuals left behind. A number of papers have analyzed the consequences
of a family member’s migration on the education outcomes of left-behind children although
no consensus has been reached on the sign and magnitude of such an impact. On the
one hand, parental emigration inherently implies their absence from the household and can
hence have detrimental effects on children’s outcomes (Antman Antman). On the other
hand, migration usually entails a flow of remittances that might be invested in children’s
education. Therefore, migration represents a type of parental absence that is fundamentally
different from other types of separation, such as death or divorce. Furthermore, the effects
of migration on children’s outcomes have been shown to be very heterogeneous, varying
depending on the age and gender of the child, as well as the gender of the parent (for a
review see Antman Antman).
The novel approach of this paper is to study changes in sibship correlation in response
to parental migration and, hence, to incorporate the role of sibling interactions in a context
where parents are absent due to migration. In practice, we study the effect of a sibling’s
achievement on another sibling’s achievement focusing on how such influences change in mi-
grant versus non-migrant households. Our approach combines two strands of the literature:
The first is the migration literature on the left behind, already briefly discussed. The second
is the work focusing on the importance of siblings’ correlations.
The literature on sibling interactions has found important spillovers in education and
income (Solon 1999; Black and Devereux 2011) in several developed countries (Schnitzlein
2014). Sibling correlations capture “nature” and “nurture” effects within households, com-
mon environments, as well as the influence of one sibling on another (Black and Devereux
2011). Siblings might affect each other in a number of ways. For instance, sociologists
propose that siblings might act as role models (Haynie and McHugh 2003), and psycholo-
gists add that they might even directly shape reciprocal outcomes by providing socializing
opportunities or directly affecting (younger) siblings’ personality and intelligence (Arnold
et al. 1975). Economists have shown that older siblings influence younger siblings’ high
school graduation rates (Oettinger 2000; Rees and Sabia 2009) as well as risk-taking behav-
iors (Altonji et al. 2010). Furthermore, a long-standing literature shows how birth order,
sex composition and family size affect children’s outcomes (Behrman et al. 1982; Hanushek
1992; Kaestner 1997).
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It is rational to expect that sibling interactions might play a different – if not more im-
portant – role during parental absence, particularly in the case of migration. Yet, to the
best of our knowledge, the literature studying the impact of such disruptive events on chil-
dren’s human capital development is scant. Qualitative findings from psychology literature
suggest that siblings experience increased closeness as a result of the shared experience of
loss of a parental figure (Abbey and Dallos 2004), but very little is known about the inter-
action between siblings, human capital formation and migration. On the one hand, older
siblings might substitute for parents and hence have a stronger influence on younger children
when parents are absent. On the other hand, if supervision from parents and older siblings
are complements, parental absence will still be detrimental for younger children’s academic
achievements.
Our paper explores for the first time the role of sibling spillovers on the educational
attainment of left-behind children by focusing on China, a country where parental migration
has become a primary concern. Official Chinese statistics report that there were more than
160 million rural migrant workers in the first quarter of 2013 (NBS China 2013). This massive
migration has attracted considerable attention regarding its social consequences, specifically
because it has created a large number of split households and left-behind individuals. Due
to regulations within the hukou – the household registration system – which usually prevent
access to quality schools and welfare benefits for non-residents living in urban areas, it is
often difficult for migrant parents to bring children along. The All-Women Federation China
estimates that around 40 million children 15 and under are left behind in rural areas due
to parental migration. This accounts for around 20% of all rural children in China – and
corresponds to the total U.S. population of children roughly the same age. Given the size of
this phenomenon, it is therefore important to understand the effects of parental absence on
children left behind in rural areas. Furthermore, learning whether sibling interactions are an
intra-household mechanism that can smooth the potential adverse migration effects on the
human capital development of left-behind children is key to understanding the necessity for
and scope of public interventions that influence these interactions, e.g., the one-child policy.
This paper, therefore, provides the first evidence of the changing role of sibling interac-
tions in the context of migration. While our results cannot be interpreted as causal estimates
(in line with most of the sibling interactions literature), we exploit the richness of our dataset
and perform an array of tests to mitigate the concerns over endogeneity. Thus, methodologi-
cally we add to the literature in several respects. First, we address the problem of unobserved
shared influences using unique panel data on sibling pairs. We are therefore able to control
for all biological and environmental time-invariant factors that affect sibling interactions.
Second, to address the concerns related to the endogeneity of the migration decision, we
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adopt two strategies. We exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data to compare the
performance of left-behind and non-migrant children before their parents migrate, carefully
controlling for migration reasons. As long as the school performance of children is not driv-
ing the migration decision and future migration is not affecting past performance, such a
strategy is indicative of the relevance of the endogeneity of migration in influencing our
results. We subsequently exploit the differential timing of migration to compare currently
left-behind children with those who will be left behind in the future.
Our findings indicate that sibling influence on school performance is stronger among left-
behind children, although there is only an effect for Chinese language and not for Math.
The results also highlight remarkable heterogeneous patterns depending on the gender com-
position and the age difference between sibling pairs. Although some left-behind children
seem to suffer in terms of school performance, the presence of an older sibling completely
balances out such a negative outcome. These results therefore speak to several aspects of the
literature. First, parental migration not only results in a change in bargaining power among
household decision makers (Antman Antman), but it also triggers changes in the roles and
influences between children. Second, peer effects and sibling effects in migrant households
are meaningful factors worth studying as they seem to play a particularly important role in
shaping children’s behavior and outcomes.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the empirical
model. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Benchmark results and the hetero-
geneity analysis are presented in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 meticulously explores potential
econometric issues and outlines our strategies to mitigate endogeneity. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 Do Siblings Affect Human Capital Accumulation?
The economic literature has long recognized the important role of interactions between par-
ents and children for the child’s development. Therefore, parent-child interactions and hence
child development are affected by migration as parents are absent and children are often left
behind. Consequently, parental migration might trigger changes in resources spent on chil-
dren’s education (Hanson and Woodruff 2003). It could also affect bargaining powers within
the household or differentially influence the incentives to invest in children (Antman 2011b).
Parents or caretakers might adopt reinforcing or compensating investments in children not
only in terms of monetary resources, but also in terms of intra-household task reallocation
(Antman 2011a). There is a growing but still scant literature, including studies within the
context of developing countries, analyzing the effect of parental migration on children (for a
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review, see Antman Antman). For example, using Mexican data, Antman (2012) studies the
effect of parental migration on children’s educational attainment employing age of siblings
as an instrumental variable and finds positive effects on left-behind daughters. A few studies
have explored the outcomes of left-behind children in rural China. Using data from two
provinces only, Meyerhoefer and Chen (2011) show that migration is associated with a lag in
the educational attainment of girls, which is interpreted as a re-allocation of time spent by
girls towards household production within migrant families. Kong and Meng (2010), using
cross-sectional data for the year 2008, show that being left behind in rural areas is associated
with chlidren’s lower schooling performance (based on the subjective assessment of parents
or guardians). Chen et al. (2009) and work by Wang (2012) look at the effect of parental
absence on children’s school enrollment, performance and health. While the former study
finds no effect on educational achievement in Shaanxi province, the latter finds negative and
persistent effects of parental absence on children’s school enrollment, especially for boys. We
build upon this work and introduce the effect of sibship on the human capital performance
of children left behind in rural China.
While parent-children interaction has been receiving increased attention, the role of sib-
ling interaction in migrant households has not yet been established. The presence of an older
sibling might attenuate or reinforce the disruption from migration, hence affecting children’s
outcomes, as intra-household adjustments might be borne differently by relatively older or
younger children. The paper focuses on this novel mechanism.
In order to empirically test the research question of interest, we estimate regression
models with the young children’s school performance (exam scores in Chinese language and
Math) as the response variable and with the oldest sibling’s performance, an indicator for
being left behind and the interaction between the two latter terms as the key explanatory
covariates:
ScoreYijt = β0 + β1Score
O
jt + β2Left-Behindjt + γ(Score
O
jt × Left-Behindjt) + β3XOijt + β4Wjt + ηt + ci + ijt.
(1)
We indicate with the superscript Y the outcomes and characteristics of the young children
in the household and with the superscript O the score of the oldest child. Hence, ScoreYijt
is the score in Math or Chinese for child i, in household j, in year t. Left-Behindjt is the
indicator that equals one when either parent has lived outside the household for at least one
month in the 12 months preceding the survey.1 ScoreOjt measures the oldest sibling’s score,
1In Figure A1 we show the sensitivity of our results to more restrictive definitions (i.e. longer migration
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and thus β1 captures the correlation between the scores of the oldest and younger siblings.
The interaction term (ScoreOjt × Left-Behindjt) is the key variable of interest, measuring the
additional sibling influence if the children are left behind. In our regressions, we cluster
standard errors at the household level, accounting for key variables being measured at this
stratum.2
The regression model controls for a variety of other factors, captured by the vectors
XOijt and Wjt. Such factors measure younger children’s characteristics such as gender, age
dummies, entry grade dummies, school quality and whether they attend boarding school;
additionally, they capture family characteristics such as parents’ education and labor market
characteristics, household characteristics such as household size, land and financial assets, as
well as village characteristics and indicators for provinces (for OLS models only). Finally, ηt
measures time fixed effects, which have been included as yearly indicators, and ci captures
unobserved individual heterogeneity.
Identifying sibling influence on economic achievement in the migration context is a non-
trivial excercise. Causal interpretation of the parameters in equation 1 is prevented by the
presence of three empirical issues: (i) there might be several common background charac-
teristics or intra-household allocation of investments that can mediate the siblings’ influence
on each other, both in migrant and in non-migrant households; (ii) the reflection problem
(Manski 1993), i.e. the simultaneous determination of individual outcomes and the threat
of reverse causality due to spillover effects from younger to older children; (iii) the deci-
sion to migrate is in itself endogenously determined, with individuals self-selecting into that
choice and parents possibly being influenced by children school achievement when making
the migration decision. Points (i) and (ii) are common issues within the literature examining
siblings or peer effects, while point (iii) is related more to the migration literature. In our
context instrumental variables that tackle these points are unavailable, but our longitudinal
dataset can be exploited to provide indicative evidence on the size of γ and the direction of
the possible bias in its estimation.
As a starting point, we estimate equation 1 with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However,
simple OLS estimation ignores the unobserved individual heterogeneity that might drive
young children’s performance, capture shared time-invariant biological and environmental
factors and be correlated with the probability of being left behind or with the oldest sibling’s
scores. We therefore estimate the model in equation (1) by a standard fixed effect estimator
that purges such heterogeneity through first differences.
spells) of the left-behind indicator.
2As a large share of the families have only two children, we do not expect the clustering at the household
level to substantially alter statistical power. We also report the baseline results without clustering in Table
A1.
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A model that controls for individual heterogeneity seems particularly relevant in this
context. Purging ci partially mitigates problems (i)-(iii). In fact, in our context the vast
majority of observations are represented by sibling pairs; hence ci almost corresponds to a
household fixed effect. By first differencing, we are therefore able to control for biological
factors and time-invariant environmental factors (point (i) above). Additionally, the use of a
fixed effects estimator partially reduces the endogeneity of the migration decision stemming
from time-invariant family traits that affect educational outcomes as well as the propensity
to migrate.
Nonetheless, concerns of reverse causality and of the influence of all time-varying factors
might persist. Therefore, caution should be used when interpreting the estimates as causal.
With these caveats in mind, we will interpret the parameters as capturing an “equilibrium
relationship”. We will provide an array of tests in Section 7 that aim to assess the role of
time-varying factors and the importance of reverse causality in our context.
3 Data
Our analysis is based on the RUMiC, a large-scale project conducted in China, comprising
the Rural Household Survey (RHS), the Urban Household Survey and a Migrant House-
hold Survey. For our purposes, we extract data from the 2009, 2010 and 2011 waves of the
RHS (see Akgu¨c et al. 2014 for a technical description of the RUMiC panel dataset). The
dataset contains detailed information about household members – including those currently
migrating out of the village – and comprises socio-demographic characteristics, labor mar-
ket outcomes, migration history and the family situation prior to leaving the hometown.
The data also provide information on educational characteristics and outcomes of children
younger than 16 years of age and family members older than 16 who are still in school. We
complement these variables with a rich set of controls at the village level, which include the
village population, educational expenses, as well as the number of teachers and pupils.
We restrict the sample to children between 5 and 18 years old continuously living in rural
areas. In the main analysis, we use pairs of older-younger siblings in which the oldest child
in the household is paired with all younger siblings (when there are more than two children
in school). To be included in the sample, siblings must be of school age and report scores.
The sample is unbalanced, with unbalances mostly attributed to exits from the panel (i.e.
children who become older than 18) and to data not being collected in one province in 2011.3
Our outcome variables are young children’s test scores in Chinese and Math in the
3Restricting the analysis to a balanced panel does not alter our conclusions. Table A1 in the Appendix
shows the results.
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semester prior to the interview and reported by a parent or guardian. Although being self-
reported, accuracy of test score reporting is increased by the fact that most Chinese schools
give each student a booklet recording scores for each semester during schooling (Chen et al.
2009). Hence, concerns of grade misreporting and recall-bias should be attenuated as such a
variable could be interpreted as a record-based variable (Chen et al. 2009). Due to varying
scoring standards across provinces and even across schools, we normalize scores by dividing
them by the highest obtainable score on the specific test (also reported by the parent or
guardian).
The key covariate of interest is an indicator for being left behind. In our baseline re-
gressions, we define a left-behind child as one whose father or mother left the hometown
for at least one month during the twelve months preceding the survey. Hence, this variable
captures children’s exposure to the absence of at least one parent during a period while
attending schooling. Each year about one-third of the children have at least one parent who
has spent some time outside the household, once again highlighting the relevance of such
a phenomenon. The most common destinations for migrants are cities on the East coast
of China or in the provincial capitals. Migrants are typically employed in low-skilled oc-
cupations mostly within the manufacturing and retail sectors. Persistent hukou regulations
determine that most rural-to-urban migrations are temporary. During their migration pe-
riod, migrants typically only return home for short periods of time, most frequently during
the Chinese New Year festivities.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the share of households by the number of children aged
5-18 in rural areas. Of households with children in the relevant age range, about 48% have
only one child, while 43% have two children. Larger families are uncommon, with about
7% having 3 children and only about 2% having 4 or 5 children. Panel (b) of Figure 1
shows the share of left-behind children in families with 1, 2, ... 5 kids. Interestingly, the
likelihood of migration is similar in households with 1 or 2 children; in both cases, the share
of left behind is about 35%. The main estimation sample excludes families with only 1
child and focuses on larger families (2 or more children). Panel (c) of the figure reports
the share of non-migrants and those left behind in the sample, as well as the number of
periods children were exposed to parental absence. Our sample showed that 35% of children
experienced parental absence between 2009 and 2011. About 16% of the sample had either
parent away in the previous year, 12% were exposed to two migration spells, while about 6%
of the children were continuously exposed to migration. Panel (d) shows with whom children
live, differentiating between left-behind children and those from non-migrant families. The
majority of left-behind children live with their grand-parents or another relative, while about
one-third live with the non-migrant parent.
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In Table 1 we show characteristics by migration status, i.e., dividing our sample of young
children into those who are left-behind and those from non-migrant families (columns 1 and
2). The share of males in the sample is around 60%, with little difference between the two
groups. This high share reflects the consequences of the one-child policy.4 The average age of
left-behind children is also similar to that of children whose parents have not migrated. There
is also rather little variation in the school entry age, averaging around six and a half years
old. Around 25%-30% of siblings are in boarding school. There seems to be some variation
in the subjective assessment of the children’s school quality, with left-behind children less
likely to be enrolled in a high-quality school (where the benchmark is the average quality of
school in the village).
Table 1 also shows the characteristics of the parents and households in which children
live. Mothers and fathers of left-behind children are more likely to engage in wage work.
The number of household members and household land size do not vary between the two
groups; however, households with children left behind have higher financial assets.
The last rows of the table report the characteristics of the children’s village and province
distribution. Left-behind children are more likely to come from smaller villages, which spend
much less on education and have fewer teachers. The provincial distribution of children left
behind differs from that of children of non-migratory parents, reflecting varying migration
propensity depending on the geographic location.5
The most interesting patterns emerging from the first two columns of Table 1 are the
rather small differences in terms of individual observable traits between the left-behind chil-
dren and those of non-migrants, with the exception of parental characteristics which, how-
ever, we will be able to control for through fixed effects estimations. Such small differences
reassure the likely absence of a strong selection between migrant and non-migrant households.
On the other hand, children in migrant households seem to come from more impoverished
villages. In all analyses, we will therefore control for time-varying village characteristics.
The third and fourth columns of Table 1 compare the characteristics of the children in
our sample with those of children who are excluded from our analysis. The latter group is
largely composed of children from one-child households, but also includes children who have
(younger or older) siblings who are currently not in school and hence do not report test scores,
4In the majority of rural areas, the policy allows couples to have a second child if their first one is a
girl. On aggregate, for families with more than one child, this determines a disproportionate share of males
among youngest siblings and females among oldest siblings: In fact, in our sample, nearly 67% of the oldest
siblings are female.
5For the 2011 wave, data from the Guangdong province were not collected, which slightly unbalances
aggregate figures on the geographical distribution. For robustness purposes, we have performed our entire
analysis on a restricted sample excluding this province, finding essentially identical results to those presented
in the paper.
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or siblings whose scores are missing. The purpose of this comparison is to highlight potential
selectivity patterns emerging from the definition of our sample. Unlike what was expected a
priori, such differences are rather limited. One peculiar aspect is the sex ratio, which again
exhibits a relatively large share of males. Within the sample of “Other children,” mostly from
one-child families, the reasons for such an unbalance are related to the consequences of sex-
selective abortions (for a recent description, see Wei and Zhang 2011). With the exception
of village characteristics and provincial distributions, other socio-demographic variables are
very similar between the children in our sample and other children.6
Table 2 shows the performance in Chinese and Math by left-behind status. For com-
pleteness, we also report exam scores of children that fall outside of our estimation sample.
Younger siblings perform consistently better than older siblings, with such differences present
for both children left behind and those living in non-migrant households. How much of the
sibling resemblance is driven by individual heterogeneity, endogeneity of the migration de-
cision or simply observable differences across the two groups? The remainder of the paper
seeks to answer these questions.
4 Results
The key results of the paper are reported in Tables 3 and 4. Starting with the OLS estimates,
some interesting patterns arise. Looking at the performance in Chinese language throughout
all specifications, there is a high correlation between the oldest and the younger child’s score,
with estimates in the range of 0.39 to 0.45. This estimated correlation is remarkably in line
with sibling correlations found in other studies (see, e.g., Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes 2010). As
shown in columns II and III of Table 3, on average the parental absence does not seem to
have a large effect on children’s performance in school, which might be driven by remittances
balancing the potential adverse effect of being left behind. Columns IV and V show the
estimates of the interaction between the older sibling’ scores and being left behind with and
without controls for several characteristics of the child, parents, household and village. Both
the indicator for being left behind and the interaction term are now sizeable in magnitude
and statistically significant.
To take a practical example, let us consider a left-behind child and a child whose parents
have not migrated, both of whom have an older sibling who scored zero in Chinese (this
example purely serves the scope of comparative statics, as there are virtually no children
exhibiting a score of zero). Compared to children of non-migrants, young left-behind children
6For example, the one-child policy was particularly enforced in rural areas of Jiangsu, Chongqing and
Sichuan. This determines that one-child families are relatively more represented in these provinces.
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with a poor performing oldest siblings face a score penalty of 12% on average. However,
as younger children are exposed to better performing siblings, not only are their scores
positively correlated to their sibling’s scores, but also the disadvantage of being left behind
is fully compensated. Therefore, left-behind children with average performing siblings end up
suffering from only a 1%-1.5% penalty in their scores. Thus, the presence of a top-performing
sibling fully re-balances the score disadvantage stemming from being left behind.
In conclusion, sibling influence is stronger in left-behind households since sibling corre-
lations are higher than in non-migrant households. All other controls exhibit the expected
sign: Children enrolled in high-quality schools have higher scores; furthermore, the higher
the number of teachers in the village, the better the children perform. Two variables inhibit
children’s scores: a high number of students in the village and the household’s land size.
Villages with too many students might have lower quality schools and education systems
less aligned with the children’s specific needs. Children from households owning more land
might face a disincentive to invest in education, and/or might be induced to work (Liang
and Chen 2007).
Columns V to VIII of Table 3 also show the same regressions for performance in Math,
with estimates for the sibling correlation very similar to those for Chinese language. However,
the estimates for the left-behind indicator and for its interaction with the oldest sibling’s score
are smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant despite following a similar pattern in
terms of sign. These results are not entirely surprising if one considers the different skills –
and their transferability – involved in the study of Chinese and Math. We could postulate
that good performance in Math is harder to achieve and can hardly be influenced by peers,
while Chinese performance – driven by a student’s ability to read and write a certain number
of characters – can be better monitored and influenced by older siblings. The result that
Math performance is more prone to the influence of factors other than sibship is broadly
compatible with evidence by Zimmerman (2003), who finds that peer effects are stronger
with verbal scores than with Math scores; by Metzler and Woessmann (2012), who find a
positive effect of teacher quality on children’s Math performance but not on reading; and
by Angrist et al. (2012), who find that a schooling program had a larger impact on Math
achievements than on reading. The different patterns between Chinese and Math scores,
and the statistical insignificance of the latter, persist throughout most of our analyses.
As previously highlighted, these patterns might suffer from the presence of individual
effects that correlate with the covariates of interest and which could stem from individual
ability as well as from the endogeneity of the migration decision. In Table 4, we tackle this
issue by estimating fixed effect regressions. The fixed effect estimator purges out any observed
and unobserved variation that is common within individuals. In our context, where the
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majority of sibling pairs are from a two-sibling household, fixed effect results are also almost
identical to results obtained by including household time-invariant effects.7 Hence, we are
able to control for any individual- or household-specific propensity to migrate. Remarkably,
the fixed effects estimates reinforce our previous findings.
As in the OLS case, left-behind children seem to suffer from parental absence in their
performance in Chinese, while there are little effects in Math. The sibling correlation remains
sizeable even after controlling for individual heterogeneity. The introduction of the fixed
effects exacerbate the older sibling’s influence on Chinese scores when parents are away: The
estimate for the interaction term between the left-behind indicator and the oldest sibling’s
score doubles compared to the OLS estimates. Achievement in Chinese of the left-behind
children is around 30% lower than that of the non-migrant children in the most conservative
specification, independent of the controls added. However, as before, left-behind children
seem to resemble their older siblings in such a way that this disadvantage is reduced and
brought to zero in the case of top-performing older siblings. As before, performance in Math
is unaffected by being left behind, and sibling influence is the same in both the migrant and
non-migrant households.
Our baseline analysis suggests two main findings. First, the presence of an older child
plays a more important role in terms of school performance when the parent has migrated.
Second, there is heterogeneity between school subjects in terms of the role that both parental
absence and sibling influence play in shaping the human capital development of the left-
behind.
5 Heterogeneity Analysis
We continue our analysis showing the heterogeneity of the results by children and parent
characteristics in Table 5. The first panel in Table 5 shows performance by the sex composi-
tion of sibling pairs. In both Chinese and Math, older male siblings do not exhibit additional
effects on the left-behind. However, the opposite is true for older female siblings. in this
case, the positive correlation across scores is amplified among left-behind households. Once
again, this pattern is strong in the case of Chinese performance. However, when focusing
on female-female pairs, we also find sibling effects in the case of Math performance, albeit
these results are statistically significant at the 10% level only. Therefore, it appears that
older sisters exhibit a nurturing effect – large enough to even reverse the penalty of being
left behind – on younger siblings, who seem to have an advantage from the presence of a
top-performing child. The changing role of female children in the household quantifies the
7Results available upon request.
12
speculative conclusion in Meyerhoefer and Chen (2011) who suggest that migrant households
re-allocate girls’ time towards household production. Additionally, these results are also in
line with evidence showing that older sisters share significant child-care responsibilities in
many developing countries (Levison and Moe 1998; Ilahi 2001; Edmonds 2006), hence po-
tentially greatly influencing their siblings’ development. Lastly, our results are also in line
with those in Qureshi (2011) who shows that schooling of older sisters has beneficial impacts
on the education of their younger brothers.
We further disentangle the effects by looking at which stage of compulsory education –
in earlier or later grades – sibling influence matters the most and at which age differential
such effects come into play. The second panel of Table 5 presents results for children with
a smaller (equal or less than 5 years) and larger (more than 5 years) age distance between
the sibling pairs. As one would perhaps expect, the sibling influence is stronger among
children whose age differential is further apart. Correlations are particularly stronger in the
left-behind group in both Chinese and Math. For children closer in age, correlations are not
only statistically insignificant but also small in terms of magnitude. With this result also
holding in the acquisition of Math skills, we could conjecture once again that this pattern
captures a nurturing effect of older siblings on younger ones.
The last four columns of this panel show the effects for younger children in grades 1 to 3
and grades above 3. Remarkably, children who have already spent a few years in school are
most affected by sibling influence. While results are non-significant for children in grades 1 to
3, children in grades 4 and above exhibit: i) a strong correlation across Chinese exam scores,
ii) a penalty if left behind, and iii) stronger dependence on older siblings’ performance if
left behind – although these effects are weaker than those by age. As before, the left-behind
disadvantage is fully compensated for by the average-performing older sibling. Overall, it
seems that the effect on younger siblings is driven by both differences in age and the younger
child’s stage on the educational ladder.
In the third panel of Table 5, we show whether the impact is stronger in households
where the child lives with parents or other individuals (relatives, friends or other people in
the village). As expected, the impact of migration and the sibling effects are stronger when
parental authority is absent and children live with members outside the restricted familial
nucleus.8 We subsequently check whether sibling correlations are stronger in households
with a previous migration experience. We select a subsample of households with a migration
8While this paper highlights the changing role of siblings in response to parental migration, there could
also be readjustments across other left-behind household members. An additional venue for further research
could explore, for instance, how grandparents or other family members influence children’s development
(along the lines of our heterogeneity tests in this section). Studying this channel might bring additional
evidence regarding the effect of migration on families left behind.
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history (i.e. those households who report having migrated before 2009) and those without.
Remarkably, only children whose parents had not previously migrated are those who face a
penalty for being left behind. As before, however, this penalty is mitigated by the presence of
siblings. Therefore, it appears that the intra-household reallocation of roles (and potentially
resources) is only temporary, and migrant households are able to adjust over time to the
possible disruption of migration.
In the last panel of Table 5, we test whether sibling effects depend on which parent is
absent. We show estimates from models in which we consider left behind children only those
whose mother is absent (columns I and IV), the father is absent (columns II and IV) and
both parents are absent (columns III and VI). Remarkably, we find similar effects on the
left behind independently of which parent migrates, although the mother matters somewhat
more for Chinese than the father. Once again, the impact is essentially zero in the case of
Math performance.
6 Econometric Issues
As mentioned in Section 2, there are three main methodological challenges in our analysis.
First, the presence of omitted time-varying environmental factors between siblings might
affect the results. Second, it might be argued that reverse causality is present with older and
younger children simultaneously influencing each other. Third, the migration decision might
remain endogenous even after controlling for several confounding factors, as we do in our
regressions. Migrants self-select in the decision to migrate, and there might be additional
unobserved factors correlated with both children’s outcomes and migration status. For in-
stance, families with better socioeconomic status, networks and earning potential might be
more (or less) likely to migrate as well as possibly provide an environment in which siblings
might interact more (or less) with each other. Furthermore, reverse causality might also be
present in this decision, with migrants moving and leaving children behind due to children’s
school performance. For example, parents might want to provide better educational oppor-
tunities for children or might decide not to move if children are facing particular difficulties
in school. Although we control for a significant variety of characteristics, it is difficult to
rule out a priori that endogeneity affects the results.
In this section, we proceed with a few robustness checks which we present in Table 6. We
aim to detect the relevance of these problems in the context of our study. Before proceeding,
it should be noted that one of the main advantages of our dataset is the panel structure,
which allows us to observe the children at three points in time. Hence, we have already
purged from the model time-invariant heterogeneity in both the migration decision and the
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siblings’ relationship by using the fixed effect estimator. The OLS estimator appeared to
be upwardly biased (as we would expect if siblings had a positive influence on each other),
although results from the OLS and fixed effect models are not very different in terms of the
magnitude of the estimated coefficients. Albeit not a test, our baseline results suggest that
reverse causality and endogeneity in migration might not be fundamental concerns given the
controls and structure of the data.
Exploiting variation in the timing of migration to mitigate endogeneity. Children
in our panel are observed as being left behind over different years. Instead of using variation
from comparing left-behind and non-migrant households, we use variation in the timing
of being left behind and drop observations of those who never migrate. In this restricted
sample, the control group consists of children who are not left behind at time t but were
either left behind in the past or will be in the future. Focusing on the left-behind for some t
is informative about the presence of the selection between stayers and movers. It should be
noted, however, that this strategy will not control for dynamic selection concerns.9 In fact,
once controlling for relevant characteristics, the key identifying assumption is the absence of
selection that changes over time. The first four columns in the upper panel of Table 6 show
the results after applying both OLS and fixed-effect estimators, which are similar to those
found in the main part of the paper. This particular exercise provides suggestive evidence
that results are not driven by the static selection into migration; however, the test remains
silent on the likelihood of dynamic selection.
Prospective migration to understand selection. As a secondary check to assess the
magnitude of self-selection in migration, we estimate the following model:
ScoreYijt = β0 + β1Score
O
jt + β2Left-Behindjt+1 + γ(Score
O
jt × Left-Behindjt+1) + β3XYijt + β4Wjt + ijt.
(2)
An established literature explores how migrants are selected by comparing the pre-migration
outcomes of future migrants with those of stayers (Moraga 2011; Kaestner and Malamud
2014). The model above proceeds in the same manner: Assuming that future migration is
unrelated to current shocks, and if selection was not a serious concern in our data, we should
expect outcomes not to differ depending on migration status. The last two columns of the
upper panel show that migration is statistically unrelated to current performance, and hence
pre-migration outcomes between migrants and stayers are not different. Furthermore, this
9Other studies have used such a technique; see for example Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999).
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analysis also suggests that parents do not respond to their children’s achievement in school
by adjusting their migration plans.
Understanding reverse causality in migration. We further investigate this last point
by directly testing whether migration depends on educational success. We relate the prob-
ability of being left behind at time t with children’s educational achievement, controlling
for the same characteristics used in the baseline specification. We therefore correlate the
probability of parents moving in response to their children’s current educational outcomes.
Following the approach adopted throughout, we estimate the model through fixed effects.
Columns I and II in the lower panel of Table 6 show the estimates from such a model.
Current performance in both Chinese and Math is unrelated to the probability of staying
behind, not only statistically but also in terms of magnitude of the coefficients. As an
additional test, we perform the same analysis, but relate the likelihood of being left behind
at t+ 1 with current performance. In other words, we look at whether children’s education
performance is related with the future migration decision. Results are reported in columns
III and IV and show that children’s current performance in Chinese and Math are also
unrelated to future parental migration. Therefore, concerns of reverse causality should not
be strong.
Understanding the importance of the reflection problem. Lastly, as already men-
tioned, younger siblings’ performance might in turn affect older siblings’ performance. Al-
though this paper does not aim to pinpoint the “directionality” of sibling interactions, we
check whether the oldest sibling responds to his or her changing role in the household. In
this test, the outcome variable is the score of the oldest sibling, while the key covariate is
an interaction term between the left-behind indicator and the average score of the younger
siblings. The last two columns of Table 6 show that the impact on the older sibling is sta-
tistically zero and very small. Although it might come as a surprise, this finding is in line
with causal results in the literature on sibling correlation in education both in developed
(Oettinger 2000) and developing countries (Nicoletti and Rabe 2014).
Further robustness checks. We have performed a series of additional robustness checks
in order to further corroborate our finding. These additional results are presented in the
Appendix. In Table A1 we explore several alternative specifications related to different sub-
samples and specifications. In the top right panel we perform our regression on the balanced
sample, i.e., when each child is observed for three consecutive waves. Next to this, we look
at a subsample of households with only two children reporting test scores, i.e., we exclude
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households with three or more children in education. While point estimates differ from the
benchmark model, the pattern of the results is essentially unchanged. In the second panel of
Table A1 we first experiment with a specification without clustering the standard errors at
the household level, and we then estimate a full interaction model in which the left-behind
indicator is interacted with both time-varying and time-invariant individual, household and
village characteristics. Both specifications exhibit a pattern remarkably similar to the bench-
mark model. In the bottom panel, we split our sample by the level of the test score observed
in the first wave. The rationale is to ascertain whether ability, here proxied by initial test
scores, is a driving force for the decision of the parents to migrate. If this were the case, es-
timates would be substantially different across the sample of children with higher and lower
initial test scores. While we find that the size of the Math estimates is slightly different
between the two samples, the estimates for the performance in Chinese, especially in the
fixed effects model, are identical.
We have also explored the sensitivity of our results to the definition of the left-behind
variable. In our benchmark model, the left-behind indicator measures parental migrations of
at least one month, encompassing both short- and long-term absences. Since our data contain
the monthly duration of the migration spell, we experiment with all possible definitions of
being left behind from the shortest possible absence (at least one month, our benchmark)
to the longest one (twelve months). Figure A1 shows the results of this exercise. The
upper values of each graph correspond to the estimates of γ, the key parameter of the
interaction term between the left-behind indicator and the test scores, while the lower values
refer to estimates of β2, the parameter pertaining to the left-behind indicator. The graph
unequivocally shows that the estimates are stable – and within the same confidence interval
– throughout the various definitions. The only exceptions are the estimates pertaining to
the most restrictive definition of migration, i.e. 12 months. Since only 2% of the children in
the sample (equivalent to 36 observations) fall under this definition, it is not surprising that
both the left-behind dummy and the interaction term are estimated with large noise.
Finally, in Tables A2 and A3 we re-estimate, respectively, the specifications of Table 3
and 4 by progressively adding controls in order to check the sensitivity of the estimates to
observable factors. Once again, the pattern of the estimates is remarkably stable and similar
to the benchmark model.
7 Conclusions
While a growing literature has analyzed the effects of parental migration on the educational
outcomes of left-behind children, this study is the first to highlight the importance of sibling
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influence in such a context. We find consistent results showing that sibling interactions
affect the cognitive development of younger children. The effects are stronger among left-
behind children, albeit only in the acquisition of language ability, in which case the positive
influence of older siblings compensates for the negative effects of being left behind. Parental
migration, hence absence, seems to trigger changes in the reciprocal roles and interactions
between children. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that such changes primarily involve the
role of older sisters and are stronger depending on the current grade and the age difference
between siblings. Additionally, effects are somewhat stronger when the mother migrates
instead of the father.
Our results suggest that sibling effects in migrant households play an important func-
tion in shaping children’s educational outcomes and success. There are several relevant
policy implications to consider. With internal migration expected to increase, the welfare of
left-behind individuals will become increasingly central to the Chinese government’s policy
agenda. Our results suggest that policies fostering sibling interactions will sort – ceteris
paribus – positive effects in terms of human capital development. The relaxation of the
one-child policy announced by the Chinese government in November 2013 has the potential
to create such externalities. Allowing a larger number of rural families to have more than
one child may create the grounds for cultivating sibling interactions.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Characteristics of Children in the Household, age 5-18
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Table 1: Characteristics of Left-Behind Children and Children in Non-Migrant Households
Variable Young Siblings (in sample) Other Children
Left-behind Non-migrant All (not in sample)
Male (D) 0.597 0.618 0.611 0.617
(0.491) (0.486) (0.488) (0.486)
Age 11.041 11.370 11.258 11.721
(3.072) (3.104) (3.097) (3.724)
Age at entry 6.560 6.746 6.683 6.658
(0.735) (0.803) (0.785) (1.293)
Boarding school (D) 0.253 0.298 0.283 0.371
(0.435) (0.458) (0.451) (0.483)
High quality school (D) 0.191 0.251 0.231 0.298
(0.394) (0.434) (0.421) (0.457)
Grade 4.968 5.269 5.167 6.378
(2.730) (2.997) (2.912) (3.583)
Father is farmer or out of labor force (D) 0.103 0.444 0.328 0.326
(0.304) (0.497) (0.470) (0.469)
Father is employee (D) 0.758 0.375 0.506 0.551
(0.428) (0.484) (0.500) (0.498)
Father is self-employed (D) 0.139 0.181 0.167 0.123
(0.346) (0.385) (0.373) (0.329)
Mother is farmer or out of labor force (D) 0.489 0.726 0.645 0.549
(0.500) (0.446) (0.479) (0.498)
Mother is employee (D) 0.429 0.201 0.278 0.387
(0.495) (0.401) (0.448) (0.487)
Mother is self-employed (D) 0.082 0.074 0.077 0.064
(0.275) (0.261) (0.266) (0.245)
Household size 5.155 4.997 5.051 4.304
(1.278) (1.183) (1.218) (1.264)
Household financial asset (ln RMB) 6.983 7.126 7.077 6.809
(2.813) (3.356) (3.181) (3.481)
Household land size (Mu/1000) 0.160 0.147 0.152 0.166
(0.276) (0.303) (0.294) (0.339)
Lag village population (/100) 2.605 3.156 2.968 2.496
(2.009) (3.043) (2.746) (1.673)
Lag village expenditure on education (Mill RMB) 0.005 0.016 0.012 0.010
(0.034) (0.131) (0.109) (0.077)
Lag village number of teachers (/100) 0.109 0.240 0.195 0.095
(0.153) (0.921) (0.755) (0.266)
Lag village number of students (/100) 2.590 3.651 3.289 1.786
(3.880) (6.256) (5.583) (3.736)
Province: Hebei 0.026 0.072 0.056 0.057
(0.160) (0.258) (0.230) (0.232)
Province: Jiangsu 0.111 0.080 0.090 0.167
(0.314) (0.271) (0.286) (0.373)
Province: Zhejiang 0.021 0.065 0.050 0.129
(0.142) (0.247) (0.218) (0.336)
Province: Anhui 0.212 0.155 0.174 0.120
(0.409) (0.362) (0.380) (0.325)
Province: Henan 0.131 0.135 0.134 0.105
(0.338) (0.342) (0.340) (0.306)
Province: Hubei 0.056 0.067 0.063 0.121
(0.231) (0.250) (0.243) (0.327)
Province: Guangdong 0.200 0.349 0.298 0.064
(0.401) (0.477) (0.458) (0.245)
Province: Chongqing 0.026 0.023 0.024 0.064
(0.160) (0.151) (0.154) (0.245)
Province: Sichuan 0.217 0.055 0.111 0.173
(0.413) (0.229) (0.314) (0.378)
Observations 534 1032 1566 4088
Source: RUMiC data, RHS waves 2009, 2010 and 2011. Standard deviations shown in parentheses.
Left-behind children are those whom had either parent leave the hometown for at least one month during
the twelve months preceding the survey. “Other Children” refers to the group of children not included
in the analysis. See text for details.
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Table 2: Test Scores in Chinese language and Math by Migra-
tion Status
Chinese Math
Left-Behind Non-Migrant Left-Behind Non-Migrant
Young sibling’s score 0.802 0.811 0.818 0.821
(0.119) (0.110) (0.122) (0.116)
Oldest siblings’ score 0.776 0.781 0.790 0.795
(0.120) (0.119) (0.127) (0.132)
Observations 534 1032 534 1032
Other children’s score 0.822 0.816 0.837 0.833
(not in sample) (0.120) (0.122) (0.119) (0.125)
Observations 1359 2729 1359 2729
Source: RUMiC data, RHS waves 2009, 2010 and 2011. Standard deviations shown
in parentheses. Scores refer to exam scores in Chinese language and Math in the
semester prior to the interview, as reported by the child’s parent or guardian.
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Table 3: Performance in Chinese and Math, OLS Results
Chinese Math
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
ScoreOjt 0.454*** 0.453*** 0.406*** 0.393*** 0.410*** 0.409*** 0.392*** 0.378***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.040) (0.039) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.014** –0.010* –0.113* –0.120** –0.008 –0.004 –0.045 –0.059
(0.007) (0.006) (0.058) (0.059) (0.007) (0.006) (0.051) (0.052)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.132* 0.140* 0.053 0.072
(0.071) (0.072) (0.060) (0.061)
Male (D) –0.005 –0.007 –0.005 –0.006 –0.008 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 –0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age –0.003* –0.005** –0.003* –0.003* –0.004** –0.002 –0.005** –0.002 –0.002 –0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age at entry –0.006 –0.012** –0.007* –0.008* –0.010** –0.009** –0.015*** –0.009** –0.009** –0.011***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Boarding school –0.007 –0.010 –0.007 –0.007 –0.006 –0.008 –0.007 –0.008 –0.008 –0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
High quality school 0.034*** 0.048*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.052*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Grade –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.001 –0.003 –0.002 –0.003 –0.003 –0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Father is employee 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.007)
Father is self-employed –0.004 0.000
(0.008) (0.009)
Mother is employee 0.012* 0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
Mother is self-employed 0.009 0.012
(0.012) (0.014)
Household size –0.003 –0.005**
(0.003) (0.003)
Household financial asset –0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Household land size –0.028** –0.030**
(0.012) (0.012)
Lag village population 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Lag village expenditure on education 0.005 –0.018
(0.021) (0.020)
Lag village number of teachers 0.015*** 0.013**
(0.004) (0.006)
Lag village number of students –0.002** –0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.31 0.10 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.29 0.32
N 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566
Source: RUMiC data, RHS waves 2009, 2010 and 2011. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses.
Column IV, V, IX and X include province fixed effects.
All regressions include year fixed effects.
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Table 4: Performance in Chinese and Math, Fixed Effects Results
Chinese Math
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
ScoreOjt 0.432*** 0.431*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.403*** 0.402*** 0.364*** 0.363***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.075) (0.072) (0.042) (0.042) (0.053) (0.053)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.018 –0.013 –0.208** –0.219** –0.009 –0.004 –0.086 –0.093
(0.013) (0.011) (0.090) (0.090) (0.016) (0.013) (0.068) (0.067)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.249** 0.256** 0.103 0.106
(0.115) (0.114) (0.081) (0.079)
Boarding school 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.002
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
High quality school 0.024** 0.026** 0.024** 0.023** 0.021** 0.021* 0.023* 0.021* 0.020 0.021*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Grade –0.003 –0.000 –0.003 –0.002 –0.002 –0.005* –0.004 –0.005* –0.005 –0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Father is employee 0.013 0.016
(0.014) (0.014)
Father is self-employed –0.002 0.021
(0.019) (0.020)
Mother is employee 0.009 –0.002
(0.015) (0.014)
Mother is self-employed –0.022 –0.027
(0.025) (0.024)
Household size 0.003 –0.007
(0.011) (0.013)
Household financial asset –0.002 –0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Household land size –0.015 –0.038**
(0.014) (0.016)
Lag village population 0.003 –0.008
(0.007) (0.007)
Lag village expenditure on education 0.078 0.026
(0.088) (0.057)
Lag village number of teachers 0.021 0.021
(0.017) (0.017)
Lag village number of students –0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.25 0.02 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.22 0.23
N 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566
Source: RUMiC data, RHS waves 2009, 2010 and 2011. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses.
All regressions include year fixed effects.
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Table 5: Heterogeneity
By Sex of Sibling Pairs
Chinese Math
MO-MY MO-FY FO-MY FO-FY MO-MY MO-FY FO-MY FO-FY
ScoreOjt 0.2317** 0.5187*** 0.2803** 0.2467* 0.2989*** 0.4409*** 0.4409*** 0.1945
(0.0974) (0.0609) (0.1390) (0.1333) (0.1020) (0.0584) (0.0928) (0.1242)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.1564 0.0882 –0.3113** –0.3318** 0.0076 0.0761 –0.0911 –0.3268**
(0.1011) (0.0979) (0.1569) (0.1508) (0.1151) (0.1678) (0.1220) (0.1549)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.1948 –0.1005 0.3918* 0.3657** 0.0191 –0.0642 0.1113 0.3538*
(0.1463) (0.1178) (0.2016) (0.1809) (0.1455) (0.2021) (0.1449) (0.1804)
N 264 248 693 361 264 248 693 361
By Age Distance By Grade of Younger Siblings
Chinese Math Chinese Math
≤ 5 years > 5 years ≤ 5 years > 5 years Grade≤ 3 Grade> 3 Grade≤ 3 Grade> 3
ScoreOjt 0.3584*** 0.1688** 0.4221*** 0.1106 0.2563*** 0.3632*** 0.2353* 0.3591***
(0.0978) (0.0681) (0.0638) (0.0784) (0.0978) (0.0938) (0.1311) (0.0617)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.1812** –0.4149** –0.0562 –0.3133** –0.2081* –0.2206* –0.1256 –0.1345*
(0.0902) (0.1938) (0.0743) (0.1328) (0.1202) (0.1198) (0.1344) (0.0731)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.2005* 0.5268** 0.0687 0.3590** 0.2314 0.2768* 0.1368 0.1525
(0.1151) (0.2448) (0.0924) (0.1480) (0.1547) (0.1504) (0.1647) (0.0927)
N 1053 513 1053 513 498 1068 498 1068
Lives with Parents or Others Migrated Before
Chinese Math Chinese Math
Parents Others Parents Others Yes No Yes No
ScoreOjt 0.2576*** 0.3097 0.3526*** 0.1786 0.3397*** 0.0918 0.3735*** 0.2851***
(0.0809) (0.2236) (0.0591) (0.1399) (0.0822) (0.1540) (0.0625) (0.0741)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.0588 –0.3513* 0.0850 –0.3111** –0.0983 –0.5643*** –0.1001 –0.1876**
(0.1034) (0.1909) (0.1626) (0.1324) (0.0840) (0.1607) (0.0975) (0.0792)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.0571 0.4467* –0.1176 0.3654** 0.1139 0.6218*** 0.1218 0.1729*
(0.1268) (0.2423) (0.1906) (0.1615) (0.1054) (0.1973) (0.1164) (0.0898)
N 991 575 991 575 1232 334 1232 334
By Absent Parent
Chinese Math
Mother Father Both Mother Father Both
ScoreOjt 0.3489*** 0.3390*** 0.3529*** 0.3836*** 0.3679*** 0.3864***
(0.0608) (0.0711) (0.0607) (0.0480) (0.0521) (0.0477)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.3063*** –0.2016** –0.2896*** –0.0898 –0.0830 –0.0797
(0.0996) (0.0900) (0.1014) (0.0746) (0.0660) (0.0758)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.3667*** 0.2452** 0.3687*** 0.0984 0.1055 0.1080
(0.1233) (0.1156) (0.1276) (0.0861) (0.0793) (0.0882)
N 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566
Source: RUMiC data, RHS waves 2009, 2010 and 2011. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses.
All regressions include year fixed effects and the full set of regressors in column V and X of Table 4.
MO=Male older sibling; MY=Male younger sibling; FO=Female older sibling; FY=Female younger sibling.
“Migrated Before” refers to whether either parent had migrated before the year 2009.
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Table 6: Robustness
Left-Behind Only Prospective Mig.
OLS Fixed Effects
Chinese Math Chinese Math Chinese Math
ScoreOjt 0.3749*** 0.3956*** 0.2831*** 0.3827*** 0.4185*** 0.4082***
(0.0419) (0.0362) (0.0841) (0.0639) (0.0620) (0.0481)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.1368** –0.0457 –0.2609*** –0.0799 –0.1026 0.0182
(0.0602) (0.0538) (0.0954) (0.0726) (0.0799) (0.0662)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.1605** 0.0560 0.3099** 0.0906 0.1286 –0.0135
(0.0744) (0.0636) (0.1212) (0.0861) (0.0989) (0.0785)
N 1420 1420 1420 1420 838 838
Fully Interacted Model
OLS Fixed Effects
Chinese Math Chinese Math
ScoreOjt 0.3852*** 0.3722*** 0.3323*** 0.3671***
(0.0403) (0.0323) (0.0688) (0.0549)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.1775* –0.0227 –0.3401*** –0.1259
(0.0926) (0.0855) (0.1286) (0.1362)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.1605** 0.0921 0.2858*** 0.1225
(0.0722) (0.0614) (0.1074) (0.0795)
N 1566 1566 1566 1566
Pr(Left behindt) Pr(Left behindt+1) Oldest Sibling
Chinese Math Chinese Math Chinese Math
ScoreOjt 0.0242 –0.0908 0.3220 –0.1455 0.5282*** 0.4979***
(0.1373) (0.1331) (0.3168) (0.2400) (0.1277) (0.0961)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.1046 –0.0887
(0.1147) (0.1050)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.1252 0.0894
(0.1417) (0.1266)
Own score –0.2278 –0.0922 –0.0404 0.4352
(0.1570) (0.1591) (0.3213) (0.3400)
N 1566 1566 838 838 1189 1189
Source: RUMiC data, RHS waves 2009, 2010 and 2011. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level
in parentheses.
All regressions include year fixed effects.
The group “Left-Behind Only” refers to children who are left behind at any year in the panel.
Prospective migrants refer to the estimation of equation 2, in which scores at time t are regressed on an indicator
for being Left-Behind at time t+ 1.
“Oldest Sibling” refers to estimating equation 1 for the sample of oldest siblings.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Estimated effects by duration of parents’ absence
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(a) Chinese, OLS
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(b) Chinese, Fixed Effects
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(c) Math, OLS
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(d) Math, Fixed Effects
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Table A1: Additional Results
Balanced Sample Only 2 Children Households
OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects
Chinese Math Chinese Math Chinese Math Chinese Math
ScoreOjt 0.4307*** 0.3414*** 0.4550*** 0.3492*** 0.3680*** 0.4047*** 0.2568*** 0.3310***
(0.0494) (0.0665) (0.0593) (0.0781) (0.0496) (0.0377) (0.0803) (0.0479)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.2197*** –0.1990** –0.1770* –0.1544 –0.1911*** –0.0632 –0.2856*** –0.1245*
(0.0721) (0.0801) (0.0949) (0.0946) (0.0638) (0.0539) (0.1069) (0.0726)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.2625*** 0.2365** 0.2003* 0.1739 0.2212*** 0.0802 0.3390** 0.1605*
(0.0886) (0.0930) (0.1177) (0.1107) (0.0789) (0.0636) (0.1366) (0.0851)
N 520 520 520 520 1151 1151 1151 1151
Without Clustering Full Interaction Model
OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects
Chinese Math Chinese Math Chinese Math Chinese Math
ScoreOjt 0.3933*** 0.3782*** 0.3310*** 0.3633*** 0.3852*** 0.3722*** 0.3323*** 0.3671***
(0.0379) (0.0298) (0.0707) (0.0549) (0.0403) (0.0323) (0.0688) (0.0549)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.1203** –0.0586 –0.2194** –0.0926 –0.1775* –0.0227 –0.3401*** –0.1259
(0.0554) (0.0462) (0.0879) (0.0684) (0.0926) (0.0855) (0.1286) (0.1362)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.1403** 0.0720 0.2564** 0.1057 0.1605** 0.0921 0.2858*** 0.1225
(0.0686) (0.0549) (0.1110) (0.0808) (0.0722) (0.0614) (0.1074) (0.0795)
N 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566
Initial Performance Above Median Initial Performance Below Median
OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects
Chinese Math Chinese Math Chinese Math Chinese Math
ScoreOjt 0.1712*** 0.2110*** 0.1241* 0.2187*** 0.3260*** 0.2690*** 0.4121*** 0.3663***
(0.0412) (0.0355) (0.0708) (0.0745) (0.0381) (0.0412) (0.0645) (0.0707)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.0488 0.0243 –0.1952** –0.1637** –0.1670** –0.1151* –0.1970** –0.0720
(0.0515) (0.0462) (0.0833) (0.0804) (0.0739) (0.0587) (0.0907) (0.0893)
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.0595 –0.0258 0.2303** 0.1913** 0.2029** 0.1523** 0.2377* 0.0698
(0.0613) (0.0528) (0.0970) (0.0948) (0.0983) (0.0746) (0.1222) (0.1089)
N 770 799 770 799 796 767 796 767
Source: RUMiC data, RHS waves 2009, 2010 and 2011. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses.
All regressions include year fixed effects and the full set of regressors in columns V and X of Table 4.
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Table A2: Performance in Chinese and Math, OLS Results, varying set of observable characteristics
Chinese Math
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.132* 0.132* 0.146** 0.140* 0.053 0.052 0.074 0.072
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061)
ScoreOjt 0.406*** 0.408*** 0.401*** 0.393*** 0.392*** 0.391*** 0.382*** 0.378***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.113* –0.119** –0.129** –0.120** –0.045 –0.050 –0.066 –0.059
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
Male (D) –0.006 –0.006 –0.007 –0.008 0.000 0.000 –0.002 –0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age –0.003* –0.003* –0.003 –0.004** –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age at entry –0.008* –0.008* –0.007* –0.010** –0.009** –0.009** –0.008** –0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Boarding school –0.007 –0.007 –0.006 –0.006 –0.008 –0.007 –0.006 –0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
High quality school 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Grade –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.001 –0.003 –0.003 –0.003 –0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Father is employee 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Father is self-employed –0.005 –0.006 –0.004 0.001 –0.000 0.000
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Mother is employee 0.015** 0.016** 0.012* 0.011 0.012* 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Mother is self-employed 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.012
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Household size –0.004* –0.003 –0.007*** –0.005**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Household financial asset –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household land size –0.037*** –0.028** –0.034*** –0.030**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Lag village population 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Lag village expenditure on education 0.005 –0.018
(0.021) (0.020)
Lag village number of teachers 0.015*** 0.013**
(0.004) (0.006)
Lag village number of students –0.002** –0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.32
N 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566
Source: RUMiC data, RHS waves 2009, 2010 and 2011. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses.
Column IV and VIII include province fixed effects.
All regressions include year fixed effects.
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Table A3: Performance in Chinese and Math, Fixed Effect Results, varying set of observable characteristics
Chinese Math
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Left-Behindjt× ScoreOjt 0.249** 0.253** 0.259** 0.256** 0.103 0.108 0.111 0.106
(0.115) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079)
ScoreOjt 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.330*** 0.331*** 0.364*** 0.359*** 0.360*** 0.363***
(0.075) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
Left-Behindjt (D) –0.208** –0.216** –0.221** –0.219** –0.086 –0.094 –0.097 –0.093
(0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067)
Boarding school 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
High quality school 0.023** 0.023** 0.022** 0.021** 0.020 0.020 0.021* 0.021*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Grade –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.005 –0.005 –0.005 –0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Father is employee 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Father is self-employed –0.003 –0.003 –0.002 0.015 0.020 0.021
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Mother is employee 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.002 –0.002 –0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Mother is self-employed –0.023 –0.021 –0.022 –0.021 –0.024 –0.027
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Household size 0.004 0.003 –0.007 –0.007
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
Household financial asset –0.002 –0.002 –0.000 –0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Household land size –0.017 –0.015 –0.036** –0.038**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
Lag village population 0.003 –0.008
(0.007) (0.007)
Lag village expenditure on education 0.078 0.026
(0.088) (0.057)
Lag village number of teachers 0.021 0.021
(0.017) (0.017)
Lag village number of students –0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23
N 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566
Source: RUMiC data, RHS waves 2009, 2010 and 2011. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses.
Column IV and VIII include province fixed effects.
All regressions include year fixed effects.
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